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It is only after much hesitation that 've have ven-
tured to submit this Brief as A1nici Curiae. Our hes-
itation has been chiefly due to the fact that the s21:1e 
questions have been ably briefed and argued in cases 
heretofore submitted and decided by yo1~r honorable 
body. 
In the case at bar, however, the decision of the Ap-
peal Tribunal and of the Industrial Commission so fla-
grantly disregards the significance of the decision of this 
Court in the case of Fuller Bru,sh Company v. Industrial 
0 ommis.sion, decided July 12, 1940, and the construc-
tion of Section 19 (j) of the Unemployment CompE:·nsa-
tion La'v declared in that decision that ''{7e feel justified 
in imposing upon the iCourt 's time to this extent. The 
fact that counsel for the Commission strenuously con-
tend in this case for a construction of the Act apparently 
at variance with the opinion of the majority of this Court 
in the Ftdler Brush case indicates an un,villingness upon 
the part of the Com1nission to apply that construction 
in its administration of the Act and a clesire to overrule 
that decision. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
While there seems to be no substantial disagree-
ment as to any of the facts in this case, there does appear 
to be some disagreement between the parties as to the 
conclusion to be drawn from those proven. In this brief 
we shall not be concerned with those conclusions. We 
shall confine ourselves to the broad question : 
Is the mining lease involved in this case a 
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contract for serYices for 'Yages or a contract of 
hire 'vithin the purview· of the Unemployment 
Compensation ~\c.t ~ 
.. A.nother 'Yay of stating this same proposition is: 
Is the relationship established by the lease 
the relation of etnployee and employer within the 
conten1plation of the Act~ 
Subsidiary to these questions is that raised by the 
appellant, namely: 
If, by literal construction of the Unemploy-
ment Coinpensation Act, the relationship estab-
lished by the lease falls within the Act, is such are-
sult within the constitutional powers of the Legis-
lature~ 
Except where unavoidable in the discussion of the 
above propositions, we shall refrain from consideration 
of the actual op·era tions of the parties to the lease, be-
lieving that any departure by the parties from the ac-
tivities expressly contemplated under the contract can 
be material only for the purpose of determining whether 
the written contract expresses the real agreement of the 
parties or is merely a camouflage to conceal the true 
relationship. In other words, in dealing with the case at 
bar we shall assume that the lease is genuine and bona 
fide and not a front to be used to circumvent the law or 
for some other ulterior purpose. By making this exclu-
sion vve do not '.vish to be understood as implying that 
anything in the record suggests such a purpose. To the 
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contrary, from reading the record we visualize opera-
tions perfectly consistent with the traditions of the min-
ing development of the west; ownership of mineral 
ground by the lessor, actual mining operations carried 
on by the lessee, with no right of supervision or control 
reserved to or exercised by the owner except such as are 
necessary for the preservation of the property for future 
development and to guarantee the payment of royalties 
payable out of production-with work requirements to 
assure some return to the owner if the ground actually 
contains ores of commercial value. 
ARGUMENT 
Is the Lease Here Involved .a Contract for Services 
For Wages or a Contract of Hire, Within the 
Purview of the Unemployment Compensation 
Act? 
In sustaining the Departmental decision holding 
that the lessees Stevenson & Alverson were employees of 
the lessor, the Combined Metals Reduction Company, the 
Appeal Tribunal made the following comment: 
,,, The statutory definition of employment con-
tained in the Utah Unemployment Compensation 
Law * * * requires that we first determine whether 
or not a service was performed for a wage or un-
der any contract of hire, written or oral, express 
or implied.'' 
He disp-osed of this requirement in the following lan-
guage: 
''In Paragraph one of the contract under con-
sideration the Company obviously required a per-
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sonal service of the lessees. This paragraph reads 
in part as follows : 'The lessee agrees * * * to 
personally supervise the work and assist in the 
performance thereof.' The remuneration of the 
nature received by the lessees has been held by 
our Supreme Court to constitute wages * * *. Our 
proper conclusion therefore is to the effect that 
the lessees did perform a service for a wage and 
therefore the (a), (b) and (c) provisions of Sec-
tion 19 (j) 5 will be applied to the relationship to 
determine whether or not it was one which con-
stituted 'employment' subject to the provisions 
of the Utah Unemployment 'Compensation Law." 
From this excerpt of the decision of the Appeal 
Tribunal, which was affirmed by the Industrial Com-
mission by its denying leave to appeal, it will be seen that 
the Ap·peal Tribunal has made a ''pro forma'' ap.plica-
tion of the reasoning and rule of decision laid down by 
~Ir. Justice Larson in the case of Fuller B·rush Company 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 P. (2d) 201. Upon finding 
that the contract required the personal attention and ac-
tivity by one of the parties in doing the work from which 
the lessees hoped to make some money and that it con-
templated the receipt by the lessees of proceeds from 
ores produced in consequence of these labors, which pro-
ceeds he called ''wages,'' he concluded that the activities 
were services performed for wages and hence were cov-
ered by the Unemployment Compensation Act unless the 
three conditions specified in sub-section 5 of Section 19 
(j) concurred. 
In arriving at this conclusion the Appeal Tribunal 
fell into the same error which has lead to the conflict 
of opinion reflected in the decisions of the various state 
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courts applying or construing similar or identical provi-
sions of their respective state Unemployment Compensa-
tion Acts. This is the error in which this Court seems 
to have fallen in its earlier decisions but which we had 
thoughi to be rectified in the Fuller Brush case, supra. 
We believe that this error is due to .a misconception 
of the purposes and intent of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Legislation, a misconception which is main-
tained and advocated by the administrative officials of 
the Department of Unemployment Compensation and its 
counsel, namely that because of the provisions of Sec-
tion 19 (j) 5 the Unemployment Compensation Act must 
be construed to include a field of relationships broader 
in scope than the traditional common-law relationship 
of master and servant and beyond the relationship of em-
ployer and employee as those words are commonly un-
derstood. 
We expect to demonstrate in this brief that such ex-
tension of coverage was not contemplated by the Legis-
lature by the adoption of the Act \vith definitions here 
involved; and is not required by the language of that 
Act. We also expect to show that the application of the 
Act to relationships other than those falling \vithin the 
general category of the traditional common-law relation-
ship of employer-e·mployee would involve a construction 
of the Act which would violate the Constitution of Utah 
and the Federal Constitution. 
The Results From the Construction Contended for by 
The Commission. 
Before discussing the meaning of the Act as dis-
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closed by the language used, the circumstances attending 
its adoption and its antecedent history, let us first ex-
plore the inevitable consequences to which the adoption 
of the reasoning employed by the Appeal Tribunal would 
lead. 
Because the performance of the lease called for per-
sonal activities on the part of the lessee which would 
presumably be of some benefit to the lessor, the Ap·peal 
Tribunal says that tl1is activity was a service within the 
1neaning of the Act and since the lessee hoped, and no 
doubt expected, reward in the shape of net proceeds from 
ores to be discovered and extracted this reward was re-
rnuneration for such service and therefore ''wages'' 
within the definition of the statute. Therefore, the serv-
ices were "employment" and covered by the law unless 
excluded by the concurrence of the three conditions speci-
fied under sub-section 5. 
Let us apply the same reasoning to the following sit-
uations: 
A lawyer renders personal services. He expects, and 
frequently gets, remuneration from his client; therefore, 
those services are personal services performed for wages 
and unless the three conditions concur they must be cov-
ered by the law and the client must he considered an em-
ployer '.vi thin the Act and the lawyer his employee (as-
suming of course that the fee, "'vage'·', amounts to 
$140.00 or more in any calendar quarter). We then ex-
amine Section 19 (j) 5 to see whether all of the conditions 
for exemption from the Act concur and "\Ve find that the 
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la~er is not entirely free from control or direction in the 
performance of his services. He must be, and is, guided 
to a certain extent in the performance of his services 
by the wishes of his client. He is, of course, controlled 
by the rules of practice and other statutory and non-
statutory provisions governing his conduct. His services 
may be terminated at the will of the client. Therefore, 
since the first condition of absolute freedom from control 
or direction does not exist he is an employee, as are all 
of his clerks and stenographers, and his client is liable 
for contributions with respect to either the full fee 
('·'wage") paid the attorney or the wages paid the at-
torney's employees, and perhaps both. 
The doctor performs services for his patient for a 
fee; therefore this contract is subject to the Act unless 
the three conditions of sub-section 5 concur. But here, 
too, in the performance of his services the doctor is to a 
certain extent controlled by the wishes of his patient, 
and in many cases by that of the patient's relatives. He 
may advise an operation 'vhich the patient refuses to 
undergo. He may wish and desire to keep the patient 
in the hospital and the patient may refuse to stay. If 
the treatment is given in the hospital the doctor must 
conform to the regulations and rules of the hospital in 
the performance of his services to the patient. His serv-
ices, too, may be terminated· at the will of the patient. 
Therefore the doctor is an employee of the patient, as are 
also the doctor's assistants, nurses, etc., and the patient 
is an employer, and if the doctor's charges should equal 
or exceed $140.00 in any one calendar quarter the patient 
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would be liable for contributions under the Act. 
The building contractor enters into a contract for the 
construction of a building according to plans and speci-
fications prepared by the owner or his agent, the archi-
tect, and subject to the supervision of the engineer and 
inspector of the owner. The contract calls for remun-
eration for the work done in the form of a flat price. 
The contract usually contemplates and sometimes re-
quires the performance of personal services by the con-
tractor or his superintendent which are for the ultimate 
benefit of the owner. The contract price is in p·art re-
muneration for these services and is, therefore, to such 
extent at least, "wages." Consequently the services con-
templated by the contract are services performed for 
wages or under a contract of hire and so are within the 
coverage of the Act unles.s the three conditions of sub-
section 5 concur. But it appears that the contract itself 
requires the work to be done according to specifications 
prepared by the owner or his architect, a detailed and 
specific control over the performance of his work; there-
fore, the contractor is an employee of the o-vvner, as are 
also all of his sub-contractors, laborers, clerks and other 
employees, and if the payments due to the contractor 
under the contract amount to $140.00 or more in any one 
calendar quarter the o'vner is liable for the payment of 
contributions with respect to such payments under the 
Unemployment ·Compensation Law. 
Take the case of the ordinary oil and gas lease. The 
lessee generally agrees to do certain development work 
and to diligently operate completed wells. Following the 
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argument of the Commission to its logical conclusion, 
the lessee and his employees would become employees 
of the landowner unless excepted by the three conditions 
of sub-section ( 5). Nothing could be farther from the 
purposes and principles of unemployment insurance. 
Other illustrations as grotesque as those above can 
easily be supplied. They all go to show that the con-
struction of the Act used by the Appeal Tribunal and 
supported by counsel in their brief in this case will nec-
essarily result in absurdities and plunge the administra-
tion in to such difficulties as will endanger, if not destroy, 
its value in the field which it \vas designed to cover. 
The foregoing illustrations indicate the necessity 
of first ascertaining what kind of service is intended by 
the use of that word in Section 19 (j) 1, which reads: 
'' 'Employment' subject to other provisions 
of this sub-section means service * * * performed 
for wages or under any contract of hire, written 
or oral, express or implied.'' 
The Words 'Service Performed for Wages or Under 
Any Contract of Hire" Necessarily Mean Serv-
ice Performed by an Individual for Another in 
the Relationship of Master and Servant. 
In Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Co1nmission, 
supra, this court announced the construction of the Un-
employment Compensation Act which we submit is the 
only rule which can be applied without disregard of the 
purp·oses and objects of the Act, the intention of the 
Legislature in adopting it, the intention of the Social 
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Security Board in recommending its adoption and that 
of Congress in adopting the Social Security Act. It is 
the only rule "\Yhich "\Yill give effect to all of the terms 
of the Act and which will avoid the miring of the ad-
ministration and industry in a morass of difficulties and 
uncertainties. It will avoid the question of the validity 
of the Act in certain constitutional aspects hereinafter 
described. 
In that case j[r. Justice Larson, after referring to 
the definition of ''employment'' in Section 19 (j) 1, 
''wages'' in Section 19 (p) and the three conditions spe-
cified in 19 (j) 5, said: 
''But these three facts (referring to the three 
conditions of sub-section 5) are not given for the 
purpose of determining whether a certain labor 
performed for service rendered comes within the 
term employment as used in the Act nor for de-
termining whether such labor or service is per-
formed for wages as used in the Act. Sub-head 5 
applies only to cases where it has been previously 
determined, where the work or service comes 
within the term of employment as defined in the 
Act and that it "\Vas performed for 'wages or un 
der a contract of hire.' Until it has been so deter-
mined sub-head 5 has no application. These con-
ditions indicate a legislative intent to make an 
exception, to eliminate from the operation of the 
Act certain kinds of personal service in private 
industry rendered for "\vages, but "\Vhich could not 
well he defined by a single v1ord or class designa-
tion like those in sub-section 6. '' 
After stating the facts of that case 1fr. Justice I_.jar-
son continues : 
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"Putting it briefly they (the Appeal Trib-
unal and Industrial Commission) found that 
claimant performed personal service, that he re-
ceived wages in the nature of commissions from 
plaintiff and therefore such personal service must 
have been rendered for plaintiff. That claimant 
performed personal service is not in dispute, but 
there is a dispute as to whether such services were 
performed for plaintiff or for self and as to 
whether he received wages therefor or profits on 
sales. In other words was the relationship be-
tween plaintiff and clajmant that of employer and 
employee or that of vendor and vendee~ The 
finding being positive and definite that the claim-
ant in the performance of personal service was 
free from all direction and control from the plain-
tiff, both in fact and under his contract of hire, 
it must follow of necessity that he did not perform 
service for plaintiff under a contract of hire or 
for wages and therefore the relationship was one 
that never came within the scope of the Act be-
cause he was not in employment that would bring 
him within the Act, to-wit: rendering personal 
service for another under a contract of hire or for 
wages. Since there \vas no obligation on plaintiff 
to pay claimant any remuneration for service but 
claimant must get his remuneration, if any, from 
his ability to sell the brushes at an advanced price 
over the cost to him and that he and not plaintiff 
assumed the risk of profit or loss on the venture 
or undertaking, it follo-ws claimant ''s services 
were not rendered for wages or under a contract 
of hire. The error came about through a misin-
terpretation of the law in holding that all personal 
services were "'\vithin the Act 1mless excluded by 
the provisions of Section 19 (j) 5,-whereas only 
those personal services are within the Act which 
are rendered for another for wages or under a 
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contract of hire. As pointed out above, Section 
19 (j) 5 is an exception provision, applying only 
after it has been determined that personal serv-
ices were rendered for another for wages or un-
der a contract of hire. It excepts from this class 
certain instances in which the three conditions of 
that section are all present. '' 
Thus in the case at bar involving the relationship of 
lessor and lessee, as also in t4e case of every other form 
of contractual relationship, it must first be determined 
that a service is performed for wages or under a con-
tract of hire, a question which cannot be decided by the 
use of Section 19 (j) 5 for neither the word "service'' 
nor the phrase ''service performed for wages'' is there 
defined. Resort must be had to extraneous sources to 
ascertain the meaning of these words and phrase. 
In the case at bar the remuneration expected by 
Stevenson and Alvers-on and received by them after 
months of unrewarded labor consisted of net returns 
from ores extracted and sold during the later period 
of their ·operations. The lessees operated at their own 
expense and risk. The lessor never agreed to pay to 
them any compensation or wage or remuneration what-
soever for their labors. To the contrary, the agreement 
in this case for remuneration vvas upon the part of the 
lessees who agreed to pay to the lessor remuneration or 
rental for the use of the premises. 
The case of the building contractors is a little closer. 
In such case the remuneration is paid by the owner to 
the contractor. It is not paid, however, exclusively for 
the personal service of the contractor or for the per-
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sonal services of any individual. It includes the cost of 
materials furnished in construction, the use of his equip-
ment and the thousand of other items of expense which 
enter into the performance of a building contract. While 
the contract may call for rendition of services (i.e. labor) 
which is calculated to be of ultimate benefit to the owner 
for remuneration which, by the terms of the definition, 
is arbitrarily called "wages," it is not a contract of hire 
nor a contract for services for wages within the purview 
of the Unemployment Compensation Law. 
Other forms of contract creating the relationships 
commonly known as that of principal and independent 
contractor have been before the courts of other states 
for decision as to liability for contributions under Un-
employment Compensation Laws similar or substantially 
identical with ·ours. In each of these cases it is held that 
the relationship covered by the Act was that which is 
commonly understood from the vvords ''employer,'' ''em-
ployee'' and ''employment.'' 
In Texas Comp·any v. Wheeless (Miss.), 187 So. 880, 
the case involved the liability of an oil refining company 
with respect to commissions paid . to a consignee of its 
products. The contract under which the consignee op-
erated provided that he was to defray all.of his expenses 
of handling, delivering and selling, own and operate his 
delivery equipment, etc., and account to the company 
for the money collected by him from the sale .of the con-
signed products. The Mississippi Unemployment Com-
pensation Law contained the same general definition of 
"employment" which was covered by the Act as dor.s 
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Utah's La,v. There, as in Utah, "employment"· was de-
fined as 
''Employment * * * means service performed 
for wages or under any contract of hire, written 
or oral, express or implied.'' 
(Compare with Section 19 (j) 1 of the Utah 
Act.) 
The ~Court said: 
''To hold that every pers-on rendering per-
sonal service for a compensation of any kind (in-
cluding commissions and bonuses) is an employee 
of the person who received a benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from the service would mean that every 
automobile salesman to whom cars are shipped on 
consignment for sale on commission, as well as 
his helpers at the place of business at the sales 
agency, all of whom gave their personal attention 
to the sale and handling of the cars, would be 
deemed employees of the factory corporation; 
that every consignee of farm implements for sale 
on commission, as a small merchant giving his 
personal attention and services to the sales, would 
be an employee of the wholesaler or manufacturer, 
and that every attorney retained by several cli-
ents and who receives a volume of business suf-
ficient to require the services of as many as eight 
employees :;(< * :r:· vvould be an employee of every 
client, and likewise would his said employees, be-
cause of the fact that said retained attorney is 
to give his personal services to the handling of 
the business entrusted to hin1. We cannot attri-
bute to the lavvmaking power such an unreason-
able intention in saying that 'employment' means 
'service performed for wages' (including commis-
sions and bonuses) and that. ''vages means remun-
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eration payable for personal services.' We must 
inevitably look, therefore, to the meaning of 'un-
der any contract of hire' .for a solution of the 
question at issue. We do not think that 'contract 
of hire' within the meaning of the act includes 
such as the one here being construed, but that it 
embraces and was intended to embrace only those 
who are under the control and direction of the al-
leged employer in the performance of the details 
of their work and in the use of the means em-
ployed." 
Washington Recorder Publishing Contpany v. Ernst 
(Wash.), 911 P. ( 2d) 718, 124 A. L. A. 667, involved a con-
tract for the distribution of newspapers. The Washing-
ton Unemployment Compensation Law was identical with 
ours. The term ''employment'' "\Vas defined generally in 
the first sub-section of Section 19 (g), in the same lan-
guage as the first sub-section 19 (j) of the Utah law. 
There, too, the Washington Law contained the three con-
ditions, the concurrence of which in any case of ''employ-
ment'' falling within the general all inclusive definition 
of the term would exclude it from coverage. The Court 
there held that the coverage intended was to he deter-
mined by the comrnon law tests of the employment rela-
tionship, and excluded fro1n coverage as an employee an 
''independent contractor.'' 
The Unemployment Insurance Act of Nebraska con-
tains a section substantially the same as sub-section (5) 
of 19 (j) of the Utah Act. 
In the very recent case of Ilill I-lotel Co1npany v. 
J(inney, et al., 29'5 N. W. 397, the Supreme Court of Nr-
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braska held that the Nebraska Act did not depart from 
the common-law definition of independent contractor. w~ 
quote from the opinion : 
'·'While there is a diversity of views among 
the courts on this subject and the opinions are 
not always unanimous, the weight of authority 
is that legislatures in enacting unemployment 
eompensation statutes did not intend to depart 
from the common-law definition of 'independent 
eon tractor.' That definition was adopted by the 
legislature of this state in the enactment of the 
Workmen's C-ompensation law and by the Ne-
braska supreme court in construing it.'' 
* * * 
'''ln both the workmen's comp·ensation law 
and the unemployment comp,ensation law the law-
makers legislated on labor problems and it should 
not be held without sound reasons that they in-
tended to vary tlie s.ta tus ·of independent contrac-
tors under the two intimately related statutes.'' 
In State ex rel Murphy Commissioner v. Welch & 
Brown (Okla.), 103 P. (2d) 533, the Oklahoma statute 
defining "employment" for purposes of Unemploymen1 
Compensation coverage was as follows: 
'' 'Employment' * * * means service * * * 
performed for remuneration or under any con-
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.'' 
It was held that as the statute did not define ''con tract 
for hire'' resort must be made to the ordinary meaning 
of the words to determine their meaning in the context 
of the Act. 
Davies v. Mandelson Co. (N.H.), 11 Atl. (2d) 830. 
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See also the following cases where the definitions of 
"employment" were worded somewhat differently but 
in each of which it was held that the coverage intended 
for unemployment compensation was the usual and ordi-
nary relationship of employer-employee. 
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay (Wis.), 290 
N. vV. 199, was a case in which one of the points decided 
was whether an ''independent contractor'' was an ''em-
ployee' and in ''employment'' under the Wisconsin Un-
employment Compensation Luw, which defined those 
terms substantially the same as does the Utah law. It 
was held that the words ''employer,., and ''employee'' 
must be given their common-law meaning and the de-
fining of the term ''employment'' as 
"any service performed by an individual for 
pay * * * under any contract of service for any 
or contract of hire * * * and that each individual 
thus engaged * * * to perform services for pay 
shall he treated as in an 'employment' unless and 
until the employer has satisfied the commission'' 
that (a) the individual is free from control, (b) that his 
work was performed outside of the employer's places 
of business and that he was customarily engaged in an 
independently established business, etc., did not make an 
independent contractor subject to the Act. 
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, (Conn.), 
4 A tl. 640, 121 A. L. R. 993. 
Barnes v. Indian Refinilng Co. (Ky.), 134 S. W. 
(2d) 620. 
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In the Matter of Fidel Association of New York (N. 
Y.), 259 A. D. 486; 20 N.Y. Supp. 381. 
Farnzers Mu.tual Fire Ins. Co. v California Employ-
ment Co,mJnission (Superior Ct, Sacramento Co., Calif.), 
Commerce Clearing House Unemployment Compensa-
tion Service, Sec. 8291. Prentice Hall Unemployment 
Insurance Service, Calif., Sec. 29, 623. 
See also Corviello v. Industrial Commission (Ohio), 
196 ~- E. 661, and lT' estern Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbu,ry 
(Cal.), 159 Pac. 721, the last two cases relating to the 
construction to be given the words "employer," "em-
ployee'' in Workmen's Compensation Acts. 
The substance of each of these cases, in so far as 
material here, is that the scope and intent of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law' is confined to the rela-
tionship of employer and employee as commonly and 
usually understood, or of master and servant, and to 
exclude from coverage the relationship of principal and 
independent contractor. 
The cases holding to the contrary are based upon 
the misinterpretation of the purpose and effect of sub-
section 5, by giving to that sub-section the force of a defi-
nition of "employment" rather than a delimitation of 
the application of the la-\v to cases of "services per-
formed for wages or undPr a contract of hire." \Ve ven-
ture to say that had these courts had before then1 the 
historical background of the development of unen1ploy-
ment insurance coupled 'vith the history of the enact-
ment of the sections in ques6on, they 'vould have arrived 
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at a different conclusion with respect to the proper con-
struction of the statute. Furthermore, most of these 
cases can be distinguished upon the ground that the facts 
disclosed a real and actual relationship of employer and 
employee contrary to the apparent relationship created 
by the contract. In other words, the contract did not ex-
press the true agreement of the parties. 
The Legislative History, Language and Plan of the 
Statute Clearly Indicates Coverage Under the 
Law Limited in Scope to the Traditional Com-
mon Law Relationship of Master and Servant. 
In defendant's brief counsel concedes that under the 
definition of employment which was contained in the 
Unemployment Con1pensation Law of 1936, the law re-
lated to and covered the traditional common law mas-
ter and servant relationship but they contend that the 
amendment of 1937 (Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937), 
which added the sub-section 5 with its three conditions 
so changed the definition as to make it immaterial wheth-
er or not the relationship bet\veen the individual and the 
unit for vvhich the services were performed \vas that of 
master and servant or principal and independent con-
tractor. They contend in this case, as did the Appeal 
Tribunal, that '·'all services performed for 'wages' shall 
constitute employment unless the three conditions speei-
fied in sub-section 5 concur'' and that this change of defi-
nition, including as it does (if \Ve accept the w·ord "'serv-
ices'' in its comprehensive meaning and disregard the 
person for whom the services are primarily performed) 
a broadening of the scope of the Act, "ras deliberate and 
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intentional. 
A critical study of the history of the Social Security 
Act in this country and of the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law of this state will demonstrate that such exten-
sion of the scope of the la'v was not intended and that 
the addition of sub-section 5 was intended merely to ex-
clude certain types of services falling within the field 
of master and servant vvhich were not susceptible of 
general classification such as enumerated in sub-sec-
tion 6. 
Many books and articles were written on the sub-
ject of unemployment insurance in the years immediately 
preceding the adoption of the F'ederal Social Security 
Act and the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act. We 
respectfully submit that a review of these publications 
will demonstrate that neither the purpose nor the theory 
of unemployment compensation contemplated the inclu-
sion 'vithin the coverage of such acts independent con-
tractors, lessees, etc., who work when and to the extent 
they please and are dependent on self-effort for a living. 
Furthermore, these publications will reveal that there 
was no public or official advocacy that unemployment 
compensation should be extended beyond the relationship 
of employer and employee. 
As an example of the contemporaneous thought, 
we quote the follo,ving from page 26 of a book 'vritten 
by Alvin H. Hansen, Professor of Economics, Univer-
sity of Minnesota; ~1errill G. Murray, Director of the 
Minnesota State Employment Service; Russell A. Stev-
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enson, Dean of the School of Business Administration, 
University of Minnesota, and Bryce M. Stewart, Direc-
tor of Research, Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., 
The University of Minnesota Press, 1934: 
''In estimating the number of gainful work-
ers who would be excluded from coverage by un-
employment insurance, a count must exclude, of 
course, the employer and entrepreneur classes, 
such as farmers, manufacturers, contractors, 
bankers, realtors, wholesalers, and merchants. 
Nor would their managers and officials care to 
be covered, since they are practically in the em-
ployer class (these should also he excluded by rea-
son of their higher salaries, as will he brought 
out later). In a category similar to that of em-
ployers are the self -employed, such as agents and 
solicitors, professional P'eople, and self-employed 
building and hand tradesmen.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
The report filed by the President's C·ommittee onEco-
nomic Security on January 15, 1935 (which is the basis 
of the Federal Social Security Act), clearly recognizes 
that unemployment insurance should only cover the em-
ployer-employee relationship. It recommends ''as es-
sential the imposition of a uniforn~ pay1"oll tax against 
which credits shall be allowed to industries in States that 
shall have passed unemployment compensation laws." 
As exemplifying the vie\v of this report, \Ve quote the 
following short excerpt found at page 11: 
"Even with compulsory coverage large 
groups of workers cannot readily be brought nn-
der unemployment compensation; among them 
employees in very small establishments, and of 
course, all self-employed persons." (Emphasis 
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ours.) 
The local recorded history of the Unemployment 
Compensation LR\Y commences in 1935 with the passage 
of the Unemployment Reserve Act of 1935 (Laws of 
1935, Chapter 38), "\vhich "\Vas entitled," An Act Establish-
ing An Unemployment Reserve Fund And Creating An 
Unemployment Reserve Fund Department Under The 
Supervision of The Industrial Commission of Utah; 
~laking ..._~n _i:\ppropriation Therefor; Providing Penal-
ties For Violations Thereof; And F'or Other Purposes.'' 
In Section 2 of that Act the Legislature declared : 
'' * * * that in its considered judgment the 
public good and the well being of the wage earn-
ers of this state require the enactment of the 
measure for the compulsory setting aside of fi-
nancial reserves for the benefit of persons unem-
ployed through no fault of their own." 
Iz1 Section 3 of that Act "ernployment" is defined: 
" 'Employment' except where the context 
shows otherwise means any employment under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, including all contracts entered into by 
helpers and assistants of employees whether paid 
by employer o1· employee if employed with the 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the em-
ployer.'' 
""\V ap;r,s" \Vere defined to include : 
'' * * * the money received for services rend-
ered such as bonus, and the reasonable value of 
board, rent, housing, lodging or similar advan-
tages received fron1 the employer.'' 
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By Section 24 of that Law the reserve fund was to be 
created by contributions payable by each employer in 
an amount equal to three percentum ''of the payroll of 
the employees for whom he is liable to pay benefits under 
this Act.'' 
After the passage of this Act Congress passed the 
Social Security Act, approved August 14, 1935. This 
Act was the outcome of the report of the Federal Coin-
mittee on Economic Security transmitted to the Presi-
dent on January 15, 1935, in which it was said at page 16: 
''So long as there is danger that business in 
some states will gain a competitive advantage 
through failure of the state to enact an unem-
ployment compensation law few such laws will 
he enacted. This obstacle to said action can he 
removed only through the imposition by the Fed-
eral Government of a uniform tax on all em-
ployers throughout the country so that no state 
\viii have an unfair advantage." 
The committee reports in the Senate and in the House 
upon the Social Security Act contain sin1ilar statements. 
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means in the 
House of Representatives said: 
"The failure of the states to enact unen~­
ployment insurance la\vs is due largely to the fact 
that to do so would handicap their industries in 
competition with the industries of other states. 
* * * A uniform nation-wide tax upon industry, 
thus removing this principal obstacle in the 'vay 
of unemployment insurance, is necessary before 
the states can go ahead.'' 
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Accordingly, the Social Security Act of 1935, in so 
far as it relates to unemployment compensation, imposed 
a nation-vYide tax upon payrolls coupled with provision 
for the allowance of credit against that tax for payments 
made under state Unemployment Compensation Laws 
vYith respect to the same payrolls. The plan is described 
in Buckstaff Bath House So. v. McKinley, 84 L. Ed. 322, 
as follo-,vs : 
''The action was designed therefore to op-
erate in a dual fashion-state laws were to be 
integrated vvith the Federal Act; payments un-
der state lavvs could be credited against liabilities 
under the other. That it was designed so as to 
bring the states in to the co-operative venture is 
clear. The fact that it would operate though 
the states did not come in does not alter the fact 
that there were great practical inducements for 
the states to become components of a unitary 
plan for unemployment relief. It is this invita-
tion by the Congress to the states which is of 
importance to the issue in this case. For certainly, 
under the co-ordinated scheme which the Act vis-
ualizes, vvhen Congress brought within its scope 
various classes of employers it in practical effect 
invited the states to tax the same classes. Hence, 
if there were any doubt as to the jurisdiction of 
the states to tax any of those classes it might 
well be removed by that invitation, for in absence 
of a declaration to the contrary, it would seem 
to be a fair presumption that the purpose of Con-
gress vYas to have the state la,,r as closely to-
terminous as possible vvith its ovvn. To the ex-
tent that it was not, the hopes for a co-ordinated 
and integrated dual system would not materi-
alize.'' 
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The credit against the nation-\vide tax on payrolls 
imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Law is ex-
pressed in the following words: 
''The taxpayer may credit against the tax im-
posed by Section 1101 of this chapter the amount 
of contributions with respect to employment dur-
ing the taxable year paid by him * * * into an un-
employment fund under a state law* * *." 
The tax imposed by Section 1101 is a percentage of 
the total -vvages payable by an employer ''with respect to 
employment.'' 
The identity of the words used in these t\vo sections 
show that the credits to be allowed must be contributions 
paid with respect to employment of the same character 
as that with respect to which the n~tional tax was im-
posed. Contributions paid '''"ith respect to employment 
not subject to the Federal tax are not eligible for credit 
and consequently such employment if taxed under the 
state law would be placed in a position of competitive dis-
advantage as against similar employnlent in states not 
imposing such tax. 
Section 1107 of the Social Security Act defines em-
ployment as follows: 
''The term 'employment' means any service 
of whatever nature performed within the United 
States by an employee for his employer except 
* * """ " 
Article 205 of Regulations 90 relating to the excise tax 
on employers under Title IX of the Social Security Act 
(issued February 17, 1936), provides : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
''The "\vords employ, employer and employee 
as used in this article are to be taken in their 
ordinary meaning * * *. 
''Individuals performing service as inde-
pendent contractors are not employees.'' 
This definition or interpretation of the words ''employ-
ment,'' ''employer'' and ''employee'' has been sustained 
by court decisions. 
In Indian Refining Company v. D~allman, 31 Fed. 
Supp. 455, the case involved a consignment contract sub-
stantially like that involved in the case of Texas ,Co. v. 
Wheeless, supra, and it was held that the relationship so 
created was not that of "employment" under the Social 
Security Act so as to make the consignor liable to tax 
with respect to the commissions paid to the consignee. 
In Texas Co. v. Higgins, 32 F!ed. Supp. 428, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York rendered a similar decision upon substantially 
identical state of facts. 
As an aid to the states in becoming a "component 
of a unitary plan for unemployment relief,'' the Social 
Security Board sent to the state legislatures various 
"draft bills'' for their guidance in enacting state laws 
which 'vould meet the ''minimum standards * :K• required 
under the Social Security Act.'' The first edition was 
dated January, 1936, the second, September, 193'6, and 
the last, January, 1937. 
The Utah Unemployment Reserve L-aw of 1935 did 
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not meet the standards set up in the Social Security Act 
for participation in the Federal appropriations made for 
the administration of state unemployment laws and con-
sequently Governor Blood called an extraordinary ses-
sion of the Legislature for the purpose of adopting a 
law which would qualify. 
In his proclamation calling this special session to 
convene on August 24, 19'36, he described the purpose to 
be to amend, "'Chapter 38, Laws of Utah, 1935, relating 
to unemployment reserves so that said Chapter when 
amended will conform to the provisions of Title III and 
IX of the Social Security Act * * * relating to the said 
subject.'' 
In his message to the Legislature he submitted to it 
one of the early editions of the draft bills prepared by 
representatives of the Social Security Board and recon1-
mended its passage. The Legislature adopted his rec-
omn1endations and passed the 1936 Law in the form sub-
mitted without change in any substantial particular. Is 
it conceivable that had Governor Blood any idea that the 
Act which he recommended imposed a tax upon indus-
trial, professional and other relationships not included 
within the scope of the Federal La-'\v he would have failed 
to mention it~ In fact it is inconceivable that had he 
believed that it imposed such a tax, thus putting business 
o_f the state under a tremendous competitive handicap 
as against business in other states, he would have rec-
ommended it. It is likewise unbelievable that had the 
Legislature so understood it would have adopted the 
Act submitted. Utah's industry is under sufficient hanrl-
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icap as things are 'vithout the voluntary addition of a 
2.7 percent tax on all profits and returns from individual 
enterprise. 
Apparently it is recognized that the 1936 statute was 
never intended to have such a broad scope, as counsel 
for the Industrial Commission and the State impliedly 
concede that its scope was limited to the master and 
servant relationship. However, after the distribution by 
by the Social Security Board of its 1937 edition of a 
suggested form of bill, which for the first time included 
a sub-section identical with sub-section 19 (j) (5), the 
Utah legislature amended the 1936 Act so as to include 
the suggested sub-section. It is now contended that the 
amendn1ent enlarged the scope of the coverage so as to 
include persons other than those who were servants un-
der common-law concepts, in spite of the fact that such 
enlargement would so injure and perhaps destroy a large 
portion of Utah's industry. 
A comparison of the definition of "employment" as 
originally enacted and as amended hy the 1937 Act (Laws 
of 1937, Chapter 43) discloses no such purpose nor effect. 
Under the 1936 Act (Section 19 (j)) ''employment'' was 
defined as follows: 
"Employment means service including serv-
ice in inter-state commerce perf.ormed for wages 
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, 
express or implied * * *. '' 
Under the 1937 Act (Section 19 (j) 1) "employment'' is 
defined: 
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''Employment subject to the other provisions 
of this sub-section means service including service 
in inter-state commerce performed for wages or 
under any contract of hire, written or oral, ex .. 
press or implied * * *. '' 
It will be noticed that the general definition of "em-
ployment'' given in the above quotations are identical 
and the only change effected by the amendment was (1) 
to add sub-paragraph 2 which refined the definition to 
provide that it would include an individual's entire serv-
ice whether performed wholly within or both within and 
without the state under certain circumstances; (2) to add 
sub-paragraph 3 which made it include services per-
formed out of the state in the event the individual per-
forming them is a resident and the commission approves 
the consent of his employing unit that his services be 
considered covered hy the Act; (3) to add sub-paragraph 
4 which provides under what circumstances the services 
would be considered localized within the state; and ( 4) 
to add sub-paragraph 5 which excludes from coverage 
under the law services vvhich, except for this provision, 
would be included within the general definition, i. e., 
vvhen the individual performing the service has been and 
v1ill be free from control and the service is outside the 
usual course of business for \vhich it was performed, 
etc., and the individual is customarily engaged in an in-
dependently established trade, etc. 
It vvill thus he seen that the amendment did nothing 
1nore than to clarify the law, retaining the general state-
ment that the employment which \Vas covered \vas that of 
service performed for wages or ~l!J~der a contract of hire 
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except where the services were of the classes exempted 
under sub-paragTaph 6 and also excepting those which 
were performed under the conditions specified in sub-
paragraph 5. 
There being no definition of the word ''service'' or 
of the words ''contract of hire'' we are compelled to re-
sort elsewhere than in the law itself to ascertain the 
meaning of the phrase '·'service performed for wages or 
under any contract of hire.'' 
Legislative History of the Section 19 (j). 
If by some twisting of language sub-paragraph ·5 
can be interpreted to enlarge the meaning ·of ''services 
for wages'' in sub-section 1 instead of to rem-ove from 
the application of the Act services for wages rendered 
under certain conditions, a study of the legislative his-
tory of the amendment itself will convince that neither 
the Legislature nor the Social Security Board which 
drafted the wording of the amendment had any idea or 
intention of giving it such effect. 
As stated above the amendment was in the identical 
language and form of the 1937 edition of the draft of 
state unemployment compensation laws prep-ared by the 
Social Security Board for use by the states in enacting 
a compensation law which would meet the "minimum 
standards for state unemployment , compensation laws 
required under the Social Security Act.'' 
In the draft so prepared and submitted by the Social 
Security Board appears a section which is identical in 
language, punctuation and paragraphing with Section 
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19 (j) as it "\vas enacted in the 1937 law. Appended to 
this section in the draft submitted appears a footnote 
reading as follows : 
''The coverage of this entire paragraph is 
designed to avoid the pToblem of conflicts be-
tween, or duplications of coverage, state laws 
which is i1nportant both for purposes of contribu-
tions from employers and benefit payments to 
eligible employees.'' 
It is significant that the comments and explanations 
accompanying the draft omit any statement which would 
indicate that the coverage of the state law if enacted 
in the forin suggested 'vould extend beyond the field cov-
ered by the Federal law and cover business relationships 
not subject to the Federal tax and would subject those 
businesses and occupations to a local tax burden which 
would place them in a position of competitive disadvan-
tage vvith eompeting business in other states not subjected 
to the same burden. There can have been no reason why 
the Social Security Board vvould prepare and submit a 
draft of bill containing a provision so oppressive to local 
industry. It is unbelievable that the Legislature of Utah 
intentionally would have adopted a law so discriminatory 
and burdens-ome under the conditions prevailing in 1937 
or at any other time before or since. 
The use of the words ''minimum standards'' on the 
cover containing the draft bills prepared by the Social 
Security Board are likewise significant. The minimum 
standards required by the Social Security Act itself 
required only the enactment of a state Unemployment 
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Compensation Law which covered the same field of em-
ployment as did the Federal Act. This, as has been 
shown, is limited to the relationship of employment as 
commonly understood by the use of the words "employ'·', 
or ''employer'' and ''employee'' and does not include 
service by individuals performing service as independent 
contractors. 
That the la'v which Utah adopted was intended to 
meet this "minimum" and nothing more is clearly indi-
cated in other ways than in the message of Governor 
Blood. 
Section 11 (h) of the 1936 Act requires the Industrial 
commission to "cooperate to the fullest extent'' with the 
Social Security Board, and to comply with the regula-
tions prescribed by the Social Security Board governing 
the expenditures of sums allotted to the state under 
Title III of the Social Security Act for the purpose of 
administration. This section vvas carried into the 1937 
and 1939 amendments where it appears as Section 11 (k). 
Section 11 (1) of the 1937 and 1939 Amendments author-
izes the making of reciprocal agreements with other 
states relating to recognition of benefit rights accumu-
lated under laws of other states or under federal laws, 
authority which it would be practical t·o exercise only in 
case the various laws were part of a co-ordinated plan. 
Section 24 of the Act, however, is most signficant. 
This section provides : 
"If the tax imposed by Title IX of the Fed-
eral Social Security Act or any amendments 
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thereto or any other federal tax against which 
contributions under this act may be credited shall, 
for any cause become inoperative, with the result 
that no portion of the contributions required wn-
der this Act may be credited against such federal 
tax, then this Act by virtue of that fact, shall be 
suspended until the legislature shall meet and 
take action relative thereto. * * * 
This section indicates, if it does not prove conclusive-
ly, that it was the purpose of the legislature to integrate 
the Utah law with the federal plan, and that all contribu-
tions levied under the Utah law were to he eligible for 
credits against the federal tax. If such eligibility is 
removed by any cause, the operation of the Utah Act is 
to be suspended, automatically, thus binding the federal 
payroll tax to its Utah correlative and conversely the 
Utah contribution to its federal correlative. This section 
we submit clearly negatives any intent to levy a tax 
which cannot be credited against a corresponding federal 
tax. To paraphrase the words of Mr. Justice Douglas 
in the Btftckstaff case, supra, ''it would seem to be a fair 
presumption that the purpose of the Utah Legislattttre 
was to have the state la"· as closely co-terminous as pos-
sible with the Social Securi,ty Act. To the extent that it 
was not, the hopes for a co-ordinated and integrated dual 
system would not materialize.',. 
In briefs heretofore submitted to the Court in other 
cases by counsel for the Industrial Commission it has 
been argued that the attempt at the 1939 session of the 
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Legislature to amend the Unemployment Compensation 
La\v proved that the Legislature intended the coverage 
of the law to be as extensive as that for which they 
now contend. 
During that session when a bill p-roposing amend-
ments to the law was being considered in the Senate, an 
amendment was moved which would have added phrases 
to various definitions to specifically exclude from 
covered employment service performed under such con-
ditions as amount to a relationship of indep·endent 
contractor. The motion was defeated, and this action, it 
was urged, evidences the intention and desire upon the 
part of the Legislature to have the existing law construed 
as covering relationships falling within that description. 
The arguments offered in support of and against 
the motion to amend are not preserved and we are in 
complete ignorance of the reasons for the defeat of the 
motion other than are disclosed in the action itself. 
vV e submit that the defeat of the motion is quite as con-
sistent with the notion that the relationship created by 
principal and indep·endent contractor was not covered by 
the existing law and that consequently the amendments 
proposed were unnecessary, as with any other theory. 
So many reasons may motivate the votes of individuals 
on a particular matter under consideration by a parlia-
mentary body that it is impossible to attribute the action 
to any one. The amendment may have been rejected be-
cause it was inartificially drawn. The Unemployment 
Compensation Law is so complex that we can readily 
appreciate the hesitancy of legislators not skilled in 
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legislative lore to tamper with a bill dealing with a sub-
ject with which they are not familiar, sponsored by an 
authority as impressive as the Social Security Board. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
Construed as a Definition In and Of Itself, Section 
19 (j) 5, Would Constitute an Unreasonable and 
Arbitr.ary Classification Violating Due Process 
and Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to t:b.e Federal Constitution and 
Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
If Section 19 (j) 5 he construed as contended for 
by the defendant in this action all persons who perform 
services of any kind are included within the Act unless 
the right to exclusion is shown by the concurring exist-
ence of each and all of the conditions set forth in sub-
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 19 (j) 5. 
Only those services as to which all of these conditions 
concur are exempted from the ·coverage of the Act and 
therefore the question arises: Does the service so 
exempted necessarily fall into a classification which is 
not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate the re-
quirements of due process~ 
The illustrations vvhich we have given above suffi-
ciently indicate the arbitrary and unreasonable conse-
quences of the application of the construction urged by 
the defendant. For example, notwithstanding a con-
tractor in the performance of a contract is absolutely free 
and independent of any control or direction in the per-
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formance of his work, but by chance he is not customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, occupa-
tion, profession or business, he would be covered by the 
Act according to the construction contended for by the 
state. A contractor engaged in identical work under an 
identical contract but who is customarily engaged in an 
independently established business, etc. is not covered 
by the Act. The question of whether or not a person is 
customarily engaged in an independently established 
business has no necessary connection with the matter 
of employment for the purpose of coverage under the 
law and a law which makes such an arbitrary condition 
the distinguishing factor between the coverage and non-
coverage violates the requirement of due process under 
both the Federal and Utah constitutions. 
What rational basis can there be for including with-
in the definition of employment under an unemployment 
insurance act the bona fide relationship of landlord and 
tenant~ Why should one tenant who because of the 
terms of his lease is required to perform certain work 
upon the leased premises be included in the coverage 
of the act and another tenant who perchance because 
the rental is larger, does not have to perform such work, 
be excluded~ What justification is there for classifying 
a farm tenant as an employee because his lease requires 
him personally to farm the land and plant such acreage 
and crops as his landlord designates. Yet if the conten-
tion of the Commission is followed to its logical con-
clusion, this necessarily must result. 
"If there is to be classification it, to be valid, 
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must rest upon 'some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object 
of the legislation, so that persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall he treated alike' Royster Guano 
Co v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L .Ed. 939." 
Utah Light and Traction Co. v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 92 Utah 404,68 P. (2d) 759. 
The contention of the Commission implies a legisla-
tive purpose to extend the term ''employment'' to in-
clude landlords and tenants within the employer-em-
ployee relationship, and, follo,ving it to the logical con-
clusion, to extend that term to include client and lawyer, 
patient and doctor, principal and independent contractor, 
and other non-employment relationships vvithin that class. 
Such classification by legislative fiat, we submit would 
he unconstitutional. In the case of In re Chicago, R. I. & 
Pre. Ry. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 312, Judge Lindley, of the 7th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, said: 
'''Congress may not arbitrarily classify an 
act as something, the attributes of which it does 
not partake * * * but it may always designate an 
act as coming within a certain category if in its 
inherent nature it may reasonably be said to be 
endowed with the qualities of such categ·ory." 
The same limitation, of course, is applicable to the 
Legislature. There is nothing in the hare relationship 
of landlord and tenant which endows with qualities of 
employment and the fiat of the legislature cannot change 
that fact. 
It 1:s, of course, unnecessary In this brief to cite 
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authorities to support the conclusion that if the relation-
ship covered by the Unemployment Compensation Act 
is limited to that of master and servant, or employer and 
employee, according to the common and well understood 
meaning of those terms, the relationship created by the 
leas·e involved in this case, "\Vhether it be that of landlord 
and tenant or of principal and independent contractor, 
is beyond the scope of the Act. The distinction between 
such relationships has been often drawn in many cases 
decided by this iCourt involving questions of workmen's 
compensation coverage and tort liability. 
CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing we have had little to say about the 
facts of this case. We have confined ourselves princi-
pally to the broad question of the limits of the coverage 
of the Unemployment Compensation Law to be deduced 
from the language used, the purposes for which it was 
designed, and the confusion and uncertainties inevitably 
the consequence of the construction contended for by 
the State. 
Applied to the facts of this case as we understand 
them from the record, we submit that the relationship 
between the lessor and lessees created hy the lease is 
not the relationship which the Unemployment Compen-
sation Law was designed and intended to cover, and that 
the ''service'' of the lessees performed during and in 
their operations under the lease was not "service per-
formed for wages or under a contract of hire". 
We also submit that those activities of the lessees 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
cannot be .said to be ''service performed for wages'' 
unless the evidence would permit a finding that the lease 
did not express the true contract of the parties but was 
a subterfuge to conceal the real relationship. No such 
finding was made by the Appeal Tribunal nor does coun-
sel make any such contention. We readily concede that 
in a proper case the Industrial Commission could look 
behind the ''front'' to ascertain an actual relationship 
other than that indicated by a contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GE'ORGE A. CRITCHLOW, 
J. A. TUC'KER, 
Amici Curiae. 
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